By: Sunil Datt, MBA, CGFM, PMP
Sunil Datt, MBA, CGFM, PMP, is Senior Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business Services.
New adage: A transmitter has no use if the receiver does not function.
Old adage: You can take a horse to the pond, but you cannot make him drink.
New version of old adage: You can take the pond to the horse, and still not make him drink.
If you ever sat in on a class or read a book on financial risk, or were a central banker, commercial/investment banker, financial regulator etc., the term ‘systemic risk’ was the one that gave you goosebumps or kept you awake at night, depending on your level of direct responsibility. And if you wanted someone’s attention, the mention of systemic risk was sure to stop them in their tracks; or in terms of the adages above, would make the horse drink immediately, and make the receiver very receptive!
And yet, no such thing happened when the GAO issued its October 2004 report titled, “Financial Regulation: Industry Changes Prompt Need to Reconsider U.S. Regulatory Structure.” In its very first paragraph the report pointed out that, “While the financial services industry and the international regulatory framework have changed, the regulatory structure for overseeing the U.S. financial services industry has not.” In addition, “no one agency or mechanism looks at risks that cross markets or industry segments or at the system and its risks as a whole.” The report was sent to the House Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services; the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury; the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Comptroller of the Currency; the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the President of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners; and other interested parties. Yet, it seems, no one was listening! Because listening, as opposed to hearing, has concomitant action inherent to it.
The only other weapon in GAO’s arsenal was the “High Risk” report. Surprisingly, the state of financial regulation did not move to that list in 2007 (the report is issued every two years), but now in 2009 when systemic collapse has already taken place, and a new administration has to deal with the crisis on a war footing. To continue with the analogies of the adages, it’s like trying to close the barn door after the horse has bolted.
Traditionally, the agency most concerned with systemic risk is the central bank, because the historically known systemic risks were banking collapses or runs on banks. But the risk of bank runs was largely contained by deposit insurance, and in the current crisis it was eliminated early by quickly raising the deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor. In the current crisis, the risks arose from the excessive derivative securitization of all kinds of assets, the major being mortgage assets, and these risks then pervaded all sectors of the financial sector as the securities were traded worldwide. Surprisingly, even GAO did not cover housing finance, its institutions and possible systemic impacts in this report. It did mention another report where it had examined the issue of governance and oversight of Government Sponsored Enterprises (GAO-04-269T).
The issue was further complicated by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 that blurred the distinctions among banking, securities and insurance activities. This further made the ‘functional’ model of regulation in the U.S. financial sector irrelevant as financial institutions now operated in multiple financial markets, but the regulators still stuck to their traditional roles—the Federal Reserve, OCC and FDIC for banks, the SEC for securities, and State Insurance Commissioners for the insurance industry.
All that being said, the point remains that once GAO pointed out the gaping hole in regulation of systemic risk, why was no action taken? There were discussions of which agency could fulfill that role, and there were fears expressed that such an agency would become super powerful. But those concerns were certainly not insurmountable.
The
creators of the American method of government and regulation created a
wonderful system of checks and balances to prevent the concentration of power
in any one agency, and thus protect the freedoms so dear to us. But on the flip
side, there appears to be no trigger that ensures action against red flags as prominent as systemic risk.
Certainly, a conscientious public servant like David Walker can resign his position
to draw attention to a massive red flag like our rising national debt, but can
there be no better mechanisms? Suggestions invited.